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by Jonathan Cooper
In this article Jonathan Cooper, Human Rights Project Director of JUSTICE, 
examines the new Act in terms of its likely role in modernising the constitutional 
framework for the protection of rights.
The Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), which gives further effect to the bulk of the substantive rights of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), is acknowledged as 
marking a watershed in the UK system of government. It may 
also be the defining piece of legislation for this government. The
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Act, for the first time as a matter of UK law, recognises that all 
within the country have certain minimum and fundamental 
human rights. This represents a dramatic shift in the 
constitutional arrangement which was premised on the Diceyan 
assumption of negative rights, the theory of which was that 
individuals could do as they pleased unless Parliament or the 
common law said that they could not.
The HRA adopts basic universal, inalienable and inherent civil 
and political rights and affirms that their recognition is essential 
to the preservation of human dignity. Their inherent nature 
stems from the fact that they are the birth right of all human 
beings. They are not granted to citizens, but are given to people 
simply by reason of their humanity. They are inalienable because 
people cannot agree to give them up or have them taken away. 
They are universal because they apply to all persons regardless of 
their status, such as nationality, religion, sex or race. The Act, by 
defining the relationship between the government and the 
governed, lays down markers of acceptable behaviour and it is 
intended to nurture a new concept of citizenship based upon 
rights and responsibilities.
This paper reflects upon the design of the HRA, considers the 
method adopted to incorporate human rights and speculates on 
how successful its scheme will be in guaranteeing rights. At the 
same time it addresses the Act's strengths and weaknesses. It also 
explores the likely impact that the Act will have on the existing 
system of government and developing UK jurisprudence, 
practice and procedure.
RIGHTS v LIBERTIES: SETTLING THE 
DISPUTE
As tar as the UK is concerned, the HRA would appear to have 
resolved the 300-year-old debate between those who advocate 
enforceable human rights standards as an essential component of 
maintaining human dignity, and those on the other hand who put 
their faith in the inherent goodness of human nature, as 
personified by the democratic process in Parliament, to protect 
against the ravages of individual governments and/or harsh laws. 
By definition, the existence of the HRA suggests that the debate 
has been settled in favour of those who believe in prescribing 
rights.
However, what is intriguing about the Act is the alchemy at its 
core, whereby the concept of parliamentary sovereignty is 
retained despite the guarantee of human rights standards. The 
Act accepts that Parliament could legislate contrary to the 
fundamental standards contained therein. In that event, all that 
a victim of such a violation could do would be to seek a 
declaration of incompatibility from the higher courts that the 
legislation in question was contrary to his or her human rights. 
Until the statute is changed, and there is no obligation on 
Parliament to remedy the defect, the violation remains lawful 
despite the inconsistency with the HRA.
WATERSHED IN UK LAW
The Act, by defining the relationship between the government and 
the governed, lays down markers of acceptable behaviour and it is 
intended to nurture a new concept of citizenship based upon rights 
and responsibilities.
It will still be open to such a victim to petition the European 
Court of Human Rights and seek redress in Strasbourg. If that 
court upholds the UK courts' decision it then becomes 
incumbent, only as a matter of public international law, on the 
British Government to change the law. The theory of 
parliamentary sovereignty is therefore retained at the heart of 
government: Parliament may do as it wishes even where 
fundamental rights are concerned; even if, in reality, as now, 
those rights will eventually be enforced.
So what has changed? On this level the Act appears to 
maintain the status quo (although the immediate impact of 
s. 3(1), once in force, is to overturn R v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, ex pane Brind [1991] 1 AC 696). As such, those 
who advocate the absolutism of human rights principles can in 
fact take little comfort from the HRA. On closer inspection, 
however, it may be that the Act's framers have stumbled upon a 
trulv innovative answer to that conundrum of the modern 
constitution: how to ensure that all branches of government take 
rights seriously and have a responsibility for their 
implementation, maintenance and development.
BRINGING IN RIGHTS
By incorporating the substantive rights of the ECHR, the HRA 
is introducing the following universal and core rights into UK 
law: the right to life, protection from torture, inhuman and 
degrading treatment, protection from forced or compulsory
labour, right to liberty and security, right to a lair hearing, 
protection from retrospective criminal law, right to private and 
family life, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom 
of assembly, right to marry, right to enjoyment of possessions, 
right to education, right to free elections and, in relation to these 
substantive rights, freedom from discrimination. The abolition 
of the death penalty, as a principle of human rights protection, 
has also been introduced into the HRA.
The Act, by simply relying on the main provisions of the 
ECHR, is arguably limiting its potential. The convention should 
be seen as a product of its time. It was drawn up in response to 
the atrocities committed throughout the 1930s and 40s. As a 
Council of Europe document, ratified in 195 1, it should also be 
considered in the context of the emerging Cold War. Despite its 
interpretation as a 'living instrument', the document itself is 
dated. For example, it does not include in its definition of 
human rights a number of social and economic rights which can 
also be considered as synonymous with human dignity- and 
integrity; such as employment, housing, welfare or healthcare, 
nor is there specific reference to the rights of children.1 o
Furthermore, the convention, significantly, does not guarantee 
an autonomous right to equality- and non-discrimination.
INTEGRATING RIGHTS: THE ACT'S 
SCHEME
The Act shrewdly requires that the enforcement of rights 
should not be left exclusively to the courts, although clearly- the 
courts will play a leading role in its implementation. Its scheme 
is as follows. The Act imposes a statutory duty on all public 
authorities to act compatibly with convention rights (s. 6(1)). 
Courts and tribunals are included within the definition of public- 
authority (s. 6(3)(a)). Once the HRA is in force, the common 
law will be read to give effect to its provisions and, so far as it is 
possible to do so, all courts and tribunals will be required to 
interpret primary and secondary legislation consistently with it 
(s. 3). If the courts cannot read primary legislation 
to comply with the Act they cannot strike it down. 
The higher courts are only empowered to declare 
such legislation incompatible with the HRA (s. 4(2)). 
Parliament is under no duty- to respond to such a 
declaration; however, if there are 'compelling 
reasons', the Act specifically provides for a fast-track 
procedure to amend an incompatible statute by way of 
Order in Council with Parliament ultimately being required to 
sanction this change in the law (s.10). It remains open to 
Parliament to amend inconsistent legislation through the 
traditional legislative process.
The positive benefit of ultimately leaving liability for 
incompatible statute law with Parliament is that its members 
cannot abdicate from their duty to legislate in compliance with 
human rights standards. If they do, the courts will now have a 
forceful method to draw their attention to anv violation. 
Parliament cannot therefore wash their hands of an issue by 
legislating in breach of the HRA with the knowledge that the 
courts will ultimately assume responsibility for inconsistent 
policy. The negative effect of the new framework is that 
Parliament can choose not to respond and in that event the 
judges, as independent arbiters, are powerless. The violation   
and its human consequences   would therefore remain 
unchecked.
Finally, the Act imposes a duty- on government to state that all 
future legislation is compatible with it, thus seeking to nurture a 
rights culture at the heart of government and Whitehall (s. 19). 
This provision is already in force and it appears that these 
statements of compatibility are to be limited to bald assertions 
that the bill in question conforms, in the ministers' opinion, with 
the Human Rights Act. Any detail is to be teased out by 
parliamentary debate and questions. Whilst it is regrettable that 
the government's duty under s. 19 is not being developed further, 
the likely effect of the statements is that a much more potent 
rights culture will emerge in both Westminster and Whitehall 
than exists at present. Evidence of this is the commitment to 
establish a Parliamentary Human Rights Committee.
THE ACT'S FUNDAMENTAL FLAW
The Act's scheme specifically acknowledges that human rights 
should be integral to all aspects of government in a modern 
democracy Despite this recognition, however, a fundamental 
flaw in the Act's structure is that it fails to include a human rights 
commission. Such an institution should have been an essential 
corollary to incorporation. The omission of a commission is 
likely to prove a false economy. It could have played an invaluable 
role in bringing rights to life. Interestingly, the government does 
appreciate the potential of such organisations. A new human 
rights commission is to oversee and keep under review the 
adequacy of human rights protection in Northern Ireland.
A commission or commissioner for human rights could have 
taken responsibility for overseeing the effective implementation 
of the Act and ensuring that all aspects of public life adopt its 
provisions to their best effect. In the absence of a commission, 
the primary means of enforcement will be through the courts. 
Therefore, this defining piece of legislation, on the back of which 
a new concept of citizenship is expected to be forged, will come 
alive principally through the adversarial process of litigation.
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The full text of the Human Rights Act 1998 may be found on the Stationery 
Office website.
MAKING REMEDIES EFFECTIVE
Although the Act incorporates the majority of the main 
convention rights, the right to an effective remedy for breach of 
a convention standard, as guaranteed by art. 1 3 of the ECHR, 
has been specifically excluded. During the Parliamentary 
debates, the Lord Chancellor sought to justify this omission by 
stating that the remedial provisions in the Bill in general and in 
clause (now section) 8 in particular, were sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of art. 13 and therefore to include it would be 
unnecessary (Hansard, HL, Nov 18 1997, vol 583, col 475). 
Section 8 empowers the courts to fashion remedies within their 
powers. However, the fact of the Act's existence and the 
presence of s. 8 may not adequately reflect the obligations 
imposed by art. 1 3 to guarantee an effective remedy.
The difficulty facing the government appears to have been 
how to reconcile the concept of a declaration of incompatibility
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with the guarantee of an effective remedy, the problem being that 
there may be circumstances where a declaration of 
incompatibility would be insufficient to satisfy art. 1 3, especially 
if Parliament and/or the government choose not to act and 
amend inconsistent legislation. In such circumstances a potential 
victim's only remedy will remain in Strasbourg.
WEAKNESSES IN THE ACT
The Act has been criticised in two areas for being weak and 
ill thought-through. These are the definition of a 'victim' and the 
access to damages and compensation. As will be shown below, 
these weaknesses may stem from an attempt to integrate into the 
Act the approach taken by the European Court and its 
interpretation of the convention. The difficulty with placing an 
over-reliance on the procedural requirements of the convention, 
is that what may be appropriate for an international regulatory 
body, which is subject to the constraints of international law, may 
not suit domestic practice and procedure.
Definition of a victim
A controversial feature of the Act is the definition of a 'victim'. 
This is because the Act relies upon the same test which is used 
by the European Court of Human Rights. That court will only 
receive applications from victims or potential victims. This test 
differs from the broader standing test in English judicial review
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which permits 'representative standing', which has meant 
organisations who are not and will not become a victim may also 
petition the courts to challenge decisions which may affect that 
organisations broader aims and objectives.
A consequence of the adoption of the more limited test in the 
HRA is that confusion and possibly unfairness may follow. If the 
courts follow a literal approach, it could mean, for example, if an 
asylum organisation seeks to challenge a policy which will affect 
all asylum seekers, their human rights arguments could be heard 
if raised under the common law, statute or European 
Community law, but not if pursued under the more 
comprehensive Human Rights Act. For the sake of clarity and 
simplicity, if nothing else, it is regrettable that the HRA did not 
choose the same approach as laid out in the Rules of the 
Supreme Court. The existence of the two tests is likely to require 
a degree of judicial gymnastics to avoid potential injustice.
Compensation and damages
A further area where the Act may become subject to criticism 
is in relation to damages and awards of compensation. As already 
discussed the Act provides for judicial remedies. In relation to 
awards of compensation, s. 8(4) requires the UK courts to take 
into account the principles adopted by the European Court of 
Human Rights under art. 41 of the convention. However, the 
difficulty with the court's awards of damages and compensation 
is that they do not adopt a coherent approach. One of the 
reasons for this is that, as an international tribunal, the court is 
unable to fully assess a damages award. In the absence of detailed 
argument and counter-argument, that court's main function has 
been, as a court of principle and last resort, to offer declaratory- 
relief. Even though, the court has taken advantage of its powers 
under art. 41 to award, if necessary, 'just satisfaction'. Any such 
awards have been ad hoc and bear no relation to UK statutory 
or common law principals for awarding damages.
The requirement for UK courts to take into account the 
European Court's powers under art. 41 is an unnecessary fetter 
on their jurisdiction which may cause confusion and uncertainty. 
A likely consequence is that much argument will be expended 
seeking to establish discernible Strasbourg principles 
appropriate to the UK from the court's case law. This in turn 
may result in the development of a hierarchical damages system: 
one under the HRA and the other under existing principles. 
Again the integrity of the Act may be called into question as 
lawyers, aware of the limits of art. 41, opt to pursue a human 
rights claim indirectly under, for example, Community law, 
instead of directly under the HRA.
CONSEQUENCES FOR UK GOVERNMENT 
AND JURISPRUDENCE
The Act will also profoundly alter the traditional approaches of 
the courts. The following touches upon how the Act and its 
interpretation will affect existing constitutional arrangements.
The globalisation of UK jurisprudence
The Act requires that the judgments, opinions and decisions 
of the European Court and Commission of Human Rights, and 
those of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 
be taken into account, and thus introduces a whole new body of 
case law into UK law (s. 2(1)). However, they are not binding on 
the UK courts, and it is anticipated that a vibrant British human 
rights jurisprudence will emerge which acknowledges that 
Strasbourg provides a standard below which it cannot fall.
Additional sources of law which will help form the developing 
UK human rights jurisprudence are other international human 
rights obligations such as the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention for the Elimination of all 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 
the Convention Against Torture, and other Cruel, Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), and the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC). These are all United Nations treaties 
which are binding on the UK.
Other Council of Europe conventions, such as the European 
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, should also be taken into consideration. 
The social and economic rights treaties of the UN, International 
Eabour Organisation, Council of Europe and other international 
bodies will be persuasive. In addition 'soft' law from 
international organisations, such as rules, declarations andO '
guidelines, will be relevant in the interpretation of HRA 
principles.
DUTY ON GOVERNMENT
... the Act imposes a duty on government to state that all future 
legislation is compatible with it, thus seeking to nurture a rights' 
culture at the heart of government and Whitehall ...
Further sources of inspiration will include decisions and 
judgments from other common law jurisdictions with 
guaranteed human rights. The decisions of the courts in the US, 
India, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa are likely to be 
particularly influential.
An inevitable consequence, therefore, of the HRA will be that 
the UK courts will have no option but to look beyond this 
jurisdiction to find aids of construction for human rights 
principles. Whilst this reliance on extra-jurisdictional case law- 
has been a growing trend, particularly in relation to public law 
and European Community law, it is likely that it will become a 
feature of litigation in all courts and tribunals which seek to rely 
on human rights principles and/or standards.
The doctrine of implied repeal
The internationalisation of UK case law will not be the only 
constitutional by-product of the HRA. The Act will impact upon 
the traditional jurisprudence of the UK in a number of other 
ways. Where the Act's scheme will have an inevitable 
consequence is in relation to the doctrine of implied repeal. As 
is clear from the face of the legislation, the Act has unique 
legislative status in that all existing and future legislation is to be 
read to give effect to the HRA, where possible. However if no 
such construction is possible, the legislation remains in force. 
The Act therefore overlooks the traditional doctrine of implied 
repeal.
Acknowledging retrospective effect
A further, and novel, development of the HRA is that it 
permits an alleged victim of a breach of the HRA to rely on its 
provisions in proceedings brought against them by a public 
authority, regardless of when the act took place (s. 22(4)). The 
act does not need to have taken place once the Act is in force. 
This section is of great significance as it permits the Act, under 
those circumstances, to have retrospective effect. Those 
classified as public authorities for the purpose of the HRA 
already need to be fully aware of the potential impact of the Act 
and take their decisions in the light of its provisions.
FUNDAMENTAL FLAW
... a fundamental flaw in the Act's structure is that it fails to include 
a human rights commission. Such an institution ... could have played 
an invaluable role in bringing rights to life.
A purposive construction
Human rights principles will demand a fundamentally 
different approach to construction and interpretation. The 
convention is a dynamic document, a 'living instrument' to be 
interpreted in the light of present day circumstances. These 
principles have meant that the European Court of Human Rights 
in turn requires that all law is given a purposive and teleological 
interpretation. This means that not only will the intention 
behind the legislation become more relevant, its interpretation 
by the courts will be examined in context and in light of the 
object and purpose of the law. Traditional principles of strict 
construction will therefore inevitably fall away as the evolving 
nature of the convention requires a correspondingly 
evolutionary interpretation. Inevitably, this development will 
have an impact on the doctrine of stare decisis.
Proportionality
The development of a general teleological approach to 
construction is not the only significant change to judicial
interpretation. A fundamental feature of human rights standards 
and their interpretation is that most decisions which affect those 
standards will now be measured against the test ofo
proportionality. This principle, also used in Community law, is 
the lifeblood of human rights enforcement. It is possibly the 
introduction of this test more than any other feature of the HRA 
which will mark the most radical changes post-incorporation. It 
requires a reasonable relationship between the goal pursued and 
the means used. As such, when rights are involved any 
interference with them should impair as little as possible the 
right or freedom in question. Additionally, any measures adopted 
which may or will interfere with rights must be carefully 
designed to meet the objectives in question. Finally, they must 
not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations.
Significantly, proportionality requires that even if the objective 
of the limitation is of sufficient importance and it has been 
carefully designed to limit the right as little as possible, it may 
still not be justified, because of the severity of the effects of the 
measure on individuals or groups.
The requirement for policy which affects fundamental rights 
now to satisfy the proportionality- test is the area where human 
rights standards are likely to have the most significant impact on 
UK law, practice and procedure. Previously a decision which had 
been taken lawfully could only be challenged on the basis of 
reasonableness and then it could only be impugned if it was so 
unreasonable that no-one could reasonably have been expected 
to reach the same decision. The test was that of irrationality, not 
rationality-. Now, all decision makers, from ministers to 
legislators, administrators to judges, will be required to satisfy 
proportionality principles. Surviving a proportionality challenge 
will be the art to formulating a successful human-rights-sensitiveo o
policy.
Enforcing rights between private parties
A further area where the HRA is likely to have a profound 
effect is on the interaction between public and private law. The 
HRA creates a statutory cause of action against public authorities 
which act in breach of its standards. However an essential issue 
which remains unresolved is the extent to which the HRA will 
apply in the regulation of affairs between private parties. Will the 
Act have horizontal as well as vertical application   i.e. will 
private individuals and/or companies be able to enforce their 
human rights against other private individuals and/or 
companies? Will the Act's scheme permit the rights contained 
within it to be enforced in private litigation? Has it created a de 
facto common law cause of action, a new constitutional tort? 
Can a plaintiff rely upon the horizontal application of human 
rights between private parties, or non-state actors? The concepts 
of horizontal and vertical application should be considered as the 
two extremes on a continuum, with a variety- of approaches in 
between.
CONCLUSION
Although the constitutional consequences of the HRA are 
beyond question, some still cannot be anticipated until the Act 
is in force and up and running. What is not in dispute is that the 
Act will have a profound impact on the development of the UK 
constitutional framework, the system of government and 
jurisprudence. However, the fundamental question will be, can
the Act's scheme deliver? Can a system for the protection and 
enforcement of recognised human rights guarantee those rights 
in the absence of a judicial power to strike down inconsistent 
legislation? This quandary is compounded by the fact that the 
Act does not guarantee an effective remedy for a breach of 
fundamental rights and neither does it provide for an institution 
charged with responsibility for their maintenance.
Without question, the Act has increased the tools available to 
the courts, Westminster and Whitehall to promote human 
rights. Human rights will now be written into the language of 
government. A culture of rights will also emerge which will mean 
that the repeal of the HRA and a return to the ancien regime is as 
likely as a revocation of the Parliament Act 1911. If the scheme 
works, the government-inspired method of adopting prescribed 
human rights may also become a constitutional innovation to be 
followed in other jurisdictions. If there can be a genuine shared 
custodianship of fundamental rights between the different 
branches of government, a cardinal dilemma would be resolved.
However, ultimately the HRA system is based upon trust, and 
whilst there is no reason to believe that we cannot have every 
confidence in all branches of government, what if ao '
constitutional crisis ensues where the courts declare legislation
incompatible and the government refuses to act, with Parliament 
accepting the government line? Although Strasbourg exists as 
ultimate arbiter of the Convention, to rely upon it to enforce 
those standards domestically makes a mockery of the Act. The 
debate therefore, may not be over, and those that believe in the 
absolute character of rights may be vindicated. However, even if 
such a scenario can be envisaged, it should not be anticipated.
The HRA's fascination is that it has the potential to produce a 
dynamic rights culture which engages government and civil 
society in a healthy dialogue. Under this scheme the promotion 
and enforcement of rights can take place at all levels and not just 
in the highest courts. This must be welcomed and the 
opportunities it presents developed. (&
Jonathan Cooper
Human Rights Project Director, JUSTICE
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